

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3728

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MBFR
SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION III: FRENCH VIEWS

REF: USNATO 3672

1. AT THE MEETING OF PERMREPS ON JULY 10 (REFTEL DE) DE ROSE (FRANCE)
PRESENTED THE VIEWS OF HIS GOVERNMENT TO OPTION III.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS MISSION TRASLATION OF TEXT OF DE ROSE'S REMARKS:

3. BEGIN TEXT:

" THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL PROBABLY REMEMBER THAT WHEN THE
FRENCH GOVERNMENT DECLINED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS, IT NOTED ITS INTENTION TO FOLLOW CLOSELY THE WORK OF
THE NAC, AND TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO STATE IF NECESSARY ITS
REFLECTIONS.

IF I TAKE THE FLOOR TODAY, IT IS BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO US
THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN OPTION III IN
THE WESTERNPROPOSALS WOULD GIVE OR WILL GIVE TO THIS
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NEOGITATION, AND TO ITS RESULTS SOME NEW ASPECTS WHICH
PREOCCUPY US.

MY AUTHORITIESHAVE STUDIED WITH THE FREATEST ATTENTION

THE DOCUMENT WHICH THE US PERREP PRESENTED TO THE COUNCIL ON JUNE 11.

EVEN BEFORE THIS COMMUNICATION OF AMBASSADOR BRUCE, WE HAD REFLECTED ON THIS QUESTION, SINCE WE HAD BEEN A RECIPIENT OF THE STUDY OF THE US AUTHORITIES DATED APRIL 30, 1973. THUS, AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR I INFORMED OUR AMERICAN COLLEAGUES OF OUR REFLECTIONS. THE WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES KINDLY TOLD US THAT THEY APPRECIATED THIS DEMARCHE AND ALSO THE REASONS FOR WHICH THEY MAINTAINED THEIR POINT OF VIEW. WE HAVE BEEN EQUALLY OPEN WITH CERTAIN OF OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS. SINCE THEN, THE WORK IN SPC OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATION HAS ADVANCED AND EVERYTHING INDICATES THAT THEY WILL MAKE AN OFFER IN THIS DIRECTION TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WARSAW PACT.

THE MOMENT HAS THEREFORE COME TO EXPRESS OUR FEARS IN THE COUNCIL, NOT IN A SPIRIT OF CRITICISM, OR WITH NEGATIVE ENDS, BUT IN THE HOPE OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE SEARCH FOR PRECAUTIONS TO TAKE IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE DANGERS OF THESE NEW CHOICES.

A. OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERN BEARS ON THE CHANGE OF NATURE THAT THIS PROPOSAL INTRODUCES INTO THE QUESTION OF FORCE REDUCTIONS. A NEGOTIATION BEARING ORIGINALLY ON REDUCTIONS LIMITED TO GROUND FORCES IS BEING TRANSFORMED PROGRESSIVELY, IN THE FACE OF THE IMMOBILITY OF THE OTHER SIDE, INTO A NEGOTIATION ENCOMPASSING AIR FORCE MANPOWER AND CERTAIN TYPES OF ARMAMENTS AND IN PARTICULAR NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT, WARHEADS AND LAUNCHERS. ARE WE NOT GOING TO END WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LIMITED ARMAMENT ZONE, WITH A SPECIAL STATUS, ON THE TERRITORY OF CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE? HOW DO WE AVOID THAT THESE LIMITATIONS CONCERNING IN PRINCIPLE ONLY US FORCES, HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON EUROPEAN FORCES IN THE ZONE? IT IS CLEAR, AS A MATTER OF FACT, THAT THE REDUCTION BY THE US OF THE NUMBER OF THEIR F-4S OR THEIR PERISHINGS ENTAILS NECESSARILY THE PLACING OF CEILINGS ON THE NUMBER OF THESE ARMAMENTS AMONG THEIR ALLIES. ANY OTHER SOLUTION WOULD OPEN TO THE SOVIETS THE POSSIBILITY
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OF RE-INTRODUCING THE TANK ARMY, WHICH THEY MUST WITHDRAW, IN THE FORM OF AN EQUIVALENT FORCE IN THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES, AND THIS WOULD DESTROY THE VERY OBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT. THE COMMITMENTS WHICH WILL THUS BE TAKEN RISK THEREFORE PREJUDICING THE RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND BEING IMPOSED ON THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS. WHO CAN SAY THAT, STEP BY STEP, ALL THE MILITARY ELEMENTS NOW PRESENT WILL NOT BE HELD TO BE HENCEFORTH INTANGIBLE COMPONENTS OF A FORCE RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS, HOWEVER, UNFAVORABLE TO US?

HOW CAN WE AVOID THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS DO NOT OFFER THE USSR AN ALMOST PERMANENT DROIT DE REGARD OVER THE DEFENSE SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN THEATER WITH ALL THE POSSIBILITIES FOR INTERFERENCE

AND PRESSURE WHICH WILL RESULT?
WE HOPE THAT YOU HAVE THE RESPONSE TO THESE QUESTIONS.
WE DO NOT SEE THE RESPONSES, FOR OR PART, AND OUR CONCERN
IS EQUAL TO THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT IS GOING TO BE BROUGHT
INTO PLAY.

B. OUR SECOND REOCCUPATION BEARS ON THE PROBLEM OF
VERIFICATION.

THE AMERICAN TEXT OF APRIL 30, 1973 IS COMPLETELY
CATEGORICAL WHEN IT DECLARES THAT THERE IS NO KNOWN METHOD TO
VERIFY THE CONTENT OF A STORAGE FACILITY OR DELIVERY CONFIGURATION,
AND THAT ON SITE INSPECTION WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE.

BARRING NEW FACTS, ARE NOT OUR ALLIES ON THIS OCCASION
GOING TO ABANDON THE PRINCIPLE THAT ALL OUR COUNTRIES HAVE UNTIL
NOW MAINTAINED, THAT THERE COULD BE NO CONTRACTUAL ARMS REDUCTION
WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTROL OR VERIFICATION? DOES IT
NOT CREATE A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO
GRANT THE SOVIETS WHAT THEY HAVE SOUGHT IN VAIN FOR
SO LONG: ACCEPTANCE, AS TRUTHFUL, OF UNVERIFIABLE DECLARATIONS
REGARDING UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS WHICH A COUNTRY WILL CLAIM
TO HAVE UNDERTAKEN.

WE ARE ASTONISHED TO SEE THAT THIS ABANDONMENT OF ONE OF
THE STRONG IDEAS OF ALL NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE QUESTIONS IS
ENVISAGED WITHOUT DISCUSSION, AND APPARENTLY UNCONSCIOUSLY.

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AMEMBASSY BONN
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C. FINALLY, AND TO CONCLUDE, I WISH TO SAY SOMETHING WITH

RESPECT TO MISSILES. THE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE EXPLAINED LAST YEAR THAT HENCEFORTH WEAPONS BELONGING TO CONTROL SYSTEMS COULD ASSURE THE COVERAGE OF CERTAIN TACTICAL OBJECTIVES LOCATED IN THE USSR, AND WHOSE DESTRUCTION IS LINKED TO PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. ONE HAS WONDERED, IN THIS REGARD, IF THIS DECISION HAS INCREASED OR DECREASED THE RISK OF DECOUPLING AMERICAN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS FROM THE TACTICAL SYSTEMS ASSIGNED TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE; HAS INCREASED OR DECREASED THE SANCTUARY QUALITY (SANCTUARISATION) OF SOVIET TERRITORY. IT WAS EXPLAINED TO US THAT THE MEASURE LEADS EFFECTIVELY TO THE OVERLAPPING OF THE TWO GREAT WEAPONS SYSTEMS. BUT THAT IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF THE EUROPEAN THEATER IS PROVIDED WITH MISSILES CAPABLE OF REACHING THE VERY TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS NECESSARY THEREFORE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF A CERTAIN NUMBER OF PERSHING AND F-4S NOT LEAD TO FALSE INTERPRETATIONS ON THE GOAL SOUGHT AFTER.

SUCH ARE, MR CHAIRMAN, OUR PREOCCUPATIONS WHICH CONCERN ABOVE ALL THE PROBLEM OF THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. I WILL NOT ENLARGE ON THE POLITICAL OR
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PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THIS MATTER. THAT IS A MUCH MORE SUBJECTIVE DOMAIN. BUT HOW COULD ONE NOT FEAR THE EXPLOITATION, DOUBTLESSLY TENDENTIOUS, BUT PERHAPS CONVINCING, WHICH THE ADVOCATES OF EUROPEAN DENUCLEARIZATION WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE WITH THESE PROPOSALS?

END TEXT

4. SYG LUNS TERMED THIS AN IMPORTANT DECLARATION, AND ASKED IF MC REP (HILL-NORTON) HAD ANY COMMENT. THE LATTER NOTED HOW SOME OF THE FRENCH CONCERNS WERE ADDRESSED IN THE DRAFT MC COMMENT ON THE SHAPE ASSESSMENT. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) CALLED THE FRENCH INTERVENTION USEFUL.

5. BRUCE(US) SAID THAT DE ROSE'S REMARKS TOUCHED ON WHAT THE FRENCH HAD SAID TO US EARLIER THIS YEAR. HE SAID HE WOULD FULLY REPORT THESE REMARKS, AND WASHINGTON WOULD EXAMINE THEM. HOWEVER, THE US HAD CAREFULLY CONSIDERED QUESTIONS OF THIS SORT. REGARDING SOVIET DROIT DE REGARD, THE US IS OPPOSED TO CEILINGS ON NON-US EQUIPMENT AND TO ANY SOVIET VOERLOOK. HE SAID HE WAS SURE THE ALLIES WOULD SEE TO IT THAT OPTION DOES NOT RESULT IN EITHER CEILINGS ON NON-US ARMAMENTS, OR IN A SOVIET DROIT DE REGARD. HE SAID THAT IF THE SOVIETS RAISED THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION, THE ALLIES SHOULD REPLY THAT WE ASSUME THE SOVIETS HAVE AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR BEING SATISFIED THAT THE US WILL MAKE THE AGREED REDUCTIONS AND ADHERE TO THE CEILING. HE THANKED THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE FOR HIS COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT.
PEREZ

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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